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Abstract
This paper analyzes the interplay between compatibility and product design decisions in
a symmetric software duopoly with network eects. We show that suppliers do not al-
ways oer dierentiated product designs and compete within the market. Rather, when-
ever both the signicance of the network eects and the costs of compatibility are high,
they oer homogeneous and incompatible variants and compete for the market, although
this leads to Bertrand competition with zero prots. Moreover, we show that given our
symmetric setting, antitrust authorities should never intervene against incompatibility,
whereas compatibility arrangements should always be under their scrutiny.
1. Introduction
In this paper we analyze the suppliers' decisions on (in)compatibility and horizontal
product designs in a symmetric microcomputer software duopoly when network eects
are present. Clear examples for microcomputer software markets with signicant net-
work eects are the markets for word processors, for spreadsheet programs, and for
database management systems. In these cases, the existence of direct network eects
due to le portability is obvious. Moreover, there are considerable indirect network
eects due to the positive correlation between the total number of users of a software
program (or of compatible programs) and the variety of complementary software for
this (these) program(s). For example, the more popular a database management pro-
gram is, the more complementary software for statistical analysis is oered for this
program.
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This paper examines the consequences of the existence of these network
eects for the case that due to intellectual property rights, compatibility can only be
established unanimously. As for the decision on product design, we have, for instance,
in mind the decision of a software supplier on whether to design a variant which aims
at a specic user group such as scientists or businessmen, or to design a variant which
tries to satisfy the needs of all users. In software markets, typically, this design decision
is irrevocably made before a credible commitment to compatibility is feasible. Hence,
we assume that the suppliers commit themselves to their product designs in the rst
stage of the game and decide on (in)compatibility in the second stage; subsequently,
they compete in prices, and in the fourth stage, consumers choose their variants.
We prove that whenever the costs of compatibility are low both compared with the
signicance of the network eects and with the heterogeneity of preferences, suppliers
develop dierentiated product designs and opt for compatibility, whereas when the costs
of compatibility are high compared with the signicance of the network eects and the
latter is low compared with the heterogeneity of preferences, they develop dierentiated
product designs and opt for incompatibility. In both these cases, a duopolistic equi-
librium occurs. However, our main new result with regard to market equilibria is that
whenever both the costs of compatibility and the signicance of the network eects are
1
Recent empirical studies on network eects in microcomputer software markets are Gandal (1994),
Gandal (1995), Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996), and Grohn (1999, pp. 115).
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high compared to the heterogeneity of preferences, suppliers develop identical variants,
opt for incompatibility, and compete for the market. This happens although such a
competition for the market leads only to normal prots and irrespective of the fact that
here, a competition within the market with dierentiated variants could lead to strictly
positive prots. As for antitrust policy, we deduce policy recommendations against the
background of the fact that antitrust authorities typically cannot intervene in the de-
cisions on horizontal product designs but only in the decisions on (in)compatibility. It
turns out that given our symmetric setting, they should never intervene when suppli-
ers opt for incompatibility but should tolerate compatibility arrangements only when
the costs of compatibility are very low compared to the signicance of the network ef-
fects. Here, our main new result is that competition for the market with incompatible
homogeneous variants is welfare superior to compatibility irrespective of how low the
costs of compatibility are. This is due to the fact that when there is competition for
the market, suppliers locate their variants at the center of the consumer distribution,
whereas under compatibility, they dierentiate them excessively.
As for the literature on horizontal product dierentiation without network eects,
our model builds on Anderson, Goeree and Ramer (1997); their results hold when
compatibility is given. As for the literature on compatibility decisions, our model builds
on Farrell and Saloner (1992), on Chou and Shy (1996), and on Woeckener (1999a).
In these articles, however, product designs are given exogenously. A rst step in the
analysis of compatibility decisions when product designs are endogenous was done in
Baake (1995). He showed that in duopolistic equilibria, product designs do not depend
on the compatibility decision. There, however, the possibility of competition for the
market was not analyzed. Finally, in an accompanying paper (Woeckener [1999b]), we
have taken account of this possibility in an asymmetric setting (one of the suppliers
is favored by network-size expectations and, thus, earns strictly positive prots from
competition for the market) and for a special version of the model presented here
(among other things, without costs of compatibility).
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, the main assumptions are
presented, and subsequently, we discuss consumers' choices and price competition. The
fourth section analyzes the decisions on compatibility and product designs, Section 5
presents our welfare analysis, and nally, we derive policy implications in Section 6.
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2. The Model
In our model there are two suppliers each of whom oers a variant of a software program
which is produced with constant marginal costs. We assume that both the marginal
costs and the xed costs of production are the same for both variants and normalize
them to zero. With regard to the decisions on product design and (in)compatibility,
we make the following assumptions:
 The suppliers can locate their variants anywhere on the Hotelling line. If dierent
locations are chosen, we call the variant located to the left A, and its address (design)
d
A
, and the variant located to the right B, and its address d
B
. Hence, d
B
  d
A
is the
extent of horizontal product dierentiation.
 The decision on (in)compatibility is a binary choice where  = 0 stands for a move to
compatibility and  = 1 stands for maintaining incompatibility. Establishing compati-
bility requires the consent of both suppliers and leads to xed costs of compatibility of
Q > 0 for each supplier. We see Q as the costs of developing a built-in converter such
as an import/export interface.
A consumer's maximal willingness to pay for variant i (i = A;B) consists of the
general willingness to pay for this variant g
i
, and the network eect rent from this
variant h
i
. With regard to g
i
and h
i
, we make the following assumptions:
 As for g
i
, we denote a consumer's address on the Hotelling line, i.e. the location of his
ideal variant, as x and the general willingness to pay for the ideal variant as b. Whereas
b is the same for all consumers, x is not. Moreover, a consumer's willingness to pay
for an existing variant overproportionally decreases in the distance between his address
(ideal variant) and the respective existing variant. Thus, individual preferences over
product designs are convex. As we see no compelling reason for a certain sign of the
third derivative @
3
g
i
=@x
3
, we use the common quadratic approach for the alienation
terms. Then, the general willingnesses to pay is g
i
(x) = b   t(x   d
i
)
2
, where t is
the measure for the convexity of preferences. As for the heterogeneity of preferences
among consumers, x is uniformly distributed along the intervall ] a; a[ with a density
of 0:5=a, where 0 < jaj <1 holds. Hence, the distribution function reads
F (x) = 0:5 +
x
2a
with   a  x  a ; (1)
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and a is the measure for the heterogeneity of preferences. Important for market equilib-
ria is the term a
2
t. Here, a higher t is qualitatively equivalent to a higher a. Therefore,
we denote this term simply as the `heterogeneity of preferences', which comprises both
inter-consumer heterogeneity and intra-consumer convexity. Note that with Equation
(1), the total mass of consumers is normalized to one. Furthermore, b is assumed
to be suciently high to guarantee that each consumer has at least for one variant
a maximal willingness to pay which is higher than the equilibrium price. With each
consumer buying only one piece of only one variant, this means that total demand is
also normalized to one and that the demand for variant i equals its market share m
i
.
 As for the network eect rents h
i
, consumers are assumed to be homogeneous with
respect to the valuation of network eects. The network size of variant i is the total
number of users who buy compatible programs and is denoted as 0  z
i
 1. In the
case of compatible variants, z
A
= z
B
= m
A
+ m
B
= 1 holds, whereas in the case of
incompatible variants, z
i
= m
i
holds. Typically, marginal network eects are decreas-
ing in network size but do not diminish completely. Therefore, we use the quadratic
approach h
i
(z
i
) = n(z
i
  cz
2
i
) with 0 < c < 0:5, so that @h
i
=@z
i
= n(1  2cz
i
) > 0 and
@
2
h
i
=@z
2
i
=  2nc < 0 hold. Here, n denotes the general signicance of the network
eects and c is the measure for the concavity of the network eect rent. With com-
patible variants ( = 0), our covered-market assumption implies h
A
= h
B
= n(1  c),
whereas with incompatible variants ( = 1), h
i
= n(m
i
  cm
2
i
) holds. Important for
market equilibria is the term n(1   c), which comprises both the general signicance
of the network eects and the degree of concavity of the network eect rent. In the
following, we denote this term simply as the `signicance of the network eects'.
Summing up our assumptions concerning the maximal willingnesses to pay, and denot-
ing prices as p
i
, we obtain
s
xi
(p
i
; d
i
; ) = b   t(x  d
i
)
2
  p
i
+
(
n(1  c) if  = 0
n(m
i
  cm
2
i
) if  = 1
(2)
as the surplus of a consumer with address x from variant i.
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3. Demand Functions and Price Competition
In this section, we derive the Nash equilibria of the fourth and the third stage of the
game. We lay emphasis on the fact that maintaining incompatibility in the second
stage can turn the market into a natural monopoly. Moreover, we restrict ourselves to
analyzing long-run equilibria where network-size expectations are fullled and where
coordination problems among consumers are solved.
3.1 Demand Functions
The derivation of demand equilibria for given prices, given (in)compatibility, and given
locations is straightforward; equating s
xA
with s
xB
leads to the address of those con-
sumers who are indierent between the two variants x^, and by substituting this address
into Equation (1), we obtain market shares m
1
and m
2
= 1   m
1
. With given com-
patibility, obviously, the network eect rent n(1   c) has no eect on x^ and, thus,
on market shares and Nash equilibria. Hence, market equilibria are the same as in
the standard Hotelling model. For given incompatibility, x^ depends on market shares
(network sizes). Here, we are only interested in demand equilibria where network-size
expectations are fullled. Then, m
i
= 0:5 0:5x^=a holds, and we obtain
2
m
i
(p
A
; p
B
; d
A
; d
B
; ) = 0:5 +
p
j
  p
i
 t(d
B
  d
A
)(d
A
+ d
B
)
4at(d
B
  d
A
)  2n(1  c)
: (3)
In the case of given compatibility, a duopoly equilibrium with strictly positive market
shares for both suppliers is guaranteed, because then there is no reason why a supplier
should accept a price and/or design disadvantage which results in zero demand for
his variant. In the case of given incompatibility, this only holds if, for a given extent
of consumer heterogeneity, the product dierentiation dominates the signicance of
the network eects, i.e. if d
B
  d
A
> n(1   c)=(2at) holds. Otherwise, relatively
strong network eects turn the market into a natural monopoly, because then demand
equilibria according to Equation (3) are unstable. This becomes clear from a look at
the surplus equations; for n(1  c) > 2at(d
B
 d
A
), an exogenous shock, however small,
sets o self-re-enforcing bandwagon eects which do not come to a halt until one of
2
In case of a  or , the upper sign holds for variant A and the lower sign holds for variant B.
For a model with adaptive expectations, see Woeckener (1999c).
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the variants has covered the whole market.
3
3.2 Price Competition
By comparing duopolistic demand equilibria for given compatibility with duopolistic
demand equilibria for given incompatibility, it becomes clear that the price elasticity
of demand is higher (in absolute terms) in the latter case. Hence, maintaining incom-
patibility leads to tougher price competition and to lower equilibrium prices. This is
due to the fact that under incompatibility, a reduction in p
i
results in a rise in m
i
which uno actu means a rise in network size (in the variety of complementary software
programs), whereas under compatibility, all consumers are in a joint network of size
one irrespective of prices. Given a duopoly, maximizing p
i
m
i
with respect to prices
leads via the FOC to
4
p
i
(d
A
; d
B
; ) = t(d
B
  d
A
)
 
2a
d
A
+ d
B
3
!
  n(1  c) ; (4)
and by substitution into Equation (3), we obtain
m
i
(d
A
; d
B
; ) = 0:5 
t(d
B
  d
A
)(d
A
+ d
B
)
12at(d
B
  d
A
)  6n(1  c)
: (5)
Note that the latter is equivalent to p
i
=[4at(d
B
 d
A
)  2n(1  c)], so that equilibrium
prots can be formulated as p
2
i
=[4at(d
B
 d
A
) 2n(1 c)]. According to Equations (4)
and (5), a supplier whose variant lies closer to the center of the consumer distribution
than his competitor's variant has both the higher price and the higher market share.
Hence, we can presume that with regard to the overall game, only equilibria which are
symmetric in locations will be of relevance. When the suppliers have maintained incom-
patibility and the network eects dominate the product dierentiation, the only stable
Nash equilibria with fullled expectations are m
1
= 1 and m
1
= 0. Then, there is com-
petition for the market, and the outcome of this competition depends on consumers'
3
Note that this instability is indicated by a positive slope of Equation (3). Moreover, note that
interior equilibria in the case of given incompatibility and n(1  c) > 2at(d
B
  d
A
) are also ruled out
by the fact that for these parameter constellations, the second-order conditions of prot maximization
are not fullled (see the next subsection).
4
The SOC read  1=[2at(d
B
  d
A
)   n(1   c)] < 0, and for given incompatibility, they are only
fullled when the product dierentiation dominates the network eects.
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expectations. Here, it seems natural to assume that the equilibrium is focal which leads
to a higher cumulated consumer surplus. As for the product design decisions in the rst
stage, this assumption implies that suppliers who opt for such a competition for the
market locate their variants at the center of the consumer distribution. Choosing any
other location would mean enabling the competitor to realize a product advantage and
monopolize the market.
5
Therefore, we can anticipate that in the case of competition
for the market, only the locations d
i
= 0 are of relevance, i.e. that the suppliers oer
homogeneous variants. Then, consumers' expectations solely depend on prices, so that
the suppliers are forced to set prices equal to marginal costs in order to maintain their
chances of becoming the monopolist. Hence, to sum up, we can state
Lemma 1:
1. If the suppliers have established compatibility in the second stage, subsequently a
competition within in the market takes place, and equilibrium prots (gross of the xed
costs of compatibility) amount to

i
(d
A
; d
B
;  = 0) =
t(d
B
  d
A
)
4a
 
2a
d
A
+ d
B
3
!
2
: (6)
2. If the suppliers have maintained incompatibility in the second stage, subsequently
a competition within the market only takes place in the case of a dominating product
dierentiation (d
B
  d
A
> n(1  c)=(2at)). Then, equilibrium prots amount to

i
(d
A
; d
B
;  = 1) =
"
t(d
B
  d
A
)
 
2a
d
A
+ d
B
3
!
  n(1  c)
#
2
4at(d
B
  d
A
)  2n(1  c)
: (7)
Otherwise, maintaining incompatibility in the second stage results in competition for
the market with normal prots.
5
Due to lower cumulated alienation eects, a standardization on the variant which is closer to the
center is always pareto-superior and leads, given equal prices, to a higher cumulated consumer surplus.
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4. Compatibility Decisions and
Competition over Product Designs
The most straightforward way to obtain the Nash equilibria of the rst two stages of
the game is to derive in a rst step the prot maximizing product designs for given
market structure (compatible duopoly, incompatible duopoly or natural monopoly),
and to examine in a second step which of these market structures arises when product
designs are xed rst. This procedure makes use of the fact that the decision on
(in)compatibility is a binary choice and avoids the rather tedious discussion of the
asymmetric equilibria of the second stage which are irrelevant for the overall game.
4.1 Profit Maximizing Product Designs for Given Market Structure
As already mentioned, with given compatibility, the results of our model are the same as
in the standard Hotelling model. From Anderson, Goeree and Ramer (1997, p. 116), we
know that in the latter, given a symmetric unimodal logconcave distribution, locations
and prices in Nash equilibria read 0:75=f(0) and 1:5t=[f(0)]
2
, respectively, where f(0) is
the density at the median.
6
For the uniform distribution, this means locations of 1:5a
and prices of 6a
2
t. Hence, a symmetric compatible duopoly emerges with individual
prots of 3a
2
t   Q. At the equilibrium locations, two partial eects equalize each
other: the price eect (moving closer to the center means tougher price competition)
and the be-where-the-consumers-are eect (moving closer to the center means a lower
average distance to consumers). Note that the prot maximizing locations lie outside
the support of the consumer distribution.
With regard to a duopolistic competition between incompatible variants, Baake
(1995, p. 9f) proved that compared with the standard Hotelling model, the existence
of network eects again has no eect on locations. Hence, the strengthening of the
price eect caused by the working of bandwagon eects is exactly compensated by the
strengthening of the be-where-the-consumers-are eect caused by the fact that market
shares are now network sizes. However, in an incompatible duopoly, prices are lower
than under compatibiliy; they amount to 6a
2
t  n(1  c) (see Equation [4]). Whether
6
The condition for uniqueness is  @
2
f=@x
2
(0)=[f(0)]
3
< 8, and in the case of a unifom distribution,
this is obviously fullled.
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this also holds for individual prots 3a
2
t   0:5n(1   c) depends on the xed costs of
compatibility.
Finally, considering a natural monopoly, we have already seen that the only location
of relevance is the center of the consumer distribution; i.e., the suppliers oer identical
product designs and make (only) normal prots.
4.2 Nash Equilibria
From the previous subsection, we know that when the suppliers intend to establish
compatibility in the second stage, they locate their variants at 1:5a in the rst stage,
whereas when they intend to maintain incompatibility, they locate them at 1:5a or at
the center. In this subsection, we examine in a rst step under which circumstances of-
fering dierentiated product designs is a Nash equilibrium. As we will see, whenever it
is a Nash equilibrium, suppliers make supranormal prots irrespective of the compati-
bility decision. Hence, whenever oering identical product designs (and earning normal
prots) is also a Nash equilibrium, we can take it for granted that oering dierentiated
variants is the focal equilibrium. Therefore, there is no need to examine under which
circumstances oering identical designs is a Nash equilibrium (which would require a
numerical analysis). Rather, it suces to show that it is a Nash equilibrium whenever
oering dierentiated designs is not.
Oering dierentiated product designs as a Nash Equilibrium
If the suppliers choose locations of 1:5a in the rst stage, they either opt for com-
patibility and make prots of 3a
2
t   Q or opt for incompatibility and make prots of
3a
2
t   0:5n(1   c) in the second stage. Obviously, the former happens whenever the
costs of compatibility are low compared with the signicance of the network eects
(Q < 0:5n(1   c)), whereas otherwise, the latter takes place. These choices are Nash
equilibria if no supplier has an incentive to change his location in order to monopolize
the market by subsequently maintaining incompatibility and setting the limit price.
Let us assume that the supplier of variant A is the one who considers deviating. If he
deviated from d
A
=  1:5a, he would locate his variant at a and subsequently maintain
incompatibility. Then, x = a-consumers choose his variant even for p
B
= 0 (given
9
dB
= 1:5a) if he sets his price equal to 0:25a
2
t. Hence, this is the limit price, which
equals his prots in the case of deviating. Comparing these prots with 3a
2
t Q and
3a
2
t  0:5n(1  c) makes clear that oering dierentiated product designs (1:5a) is a
Nash equilibrium for Q < 2:75a
2
t as well as for n(1 c) < 5:5a
2
t. As prots in the case
of deviating are strictly positive, prots in duopolistic Nash equilibria are also always
strictly positive.
Oering identical product designs as a unique Nash equilibrium
Locating the variants at the center and subsequently maintaining incompatibility and
competing for the market is a Nash equilibrium whenever no supplier can deviate
from the center and enforce a compatible or incompatible duopoly with strictly pos-
itive prots. Let us assume that the supplier of variant B is the one who considers
deviating. Then, by using Equation (6) with d
A
= 0, we can show that his prot
maximizing location in the case of deviating and subsequently maintaining incompat-
ibility is d
B
= a + n(1   c)=(3at) +
q
[a+ n(1  c)=(3at)]
2
  n(1  c)=t. Substitut-
ing this location back into Equation (6) shows that strictly positive prots require
n(1 c) < 3a
2
t to hold. Hence, oering identical product designs is a Nash equilibrium
for n(1  c) > 3a
2
t. Comparing this result with the above conditions for a duopolistic
Nash equilibrium makes clear that it is a Nash equilibrium whenever oering dieren-
tiated variants is not.
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Hence, summing up our results concerning Nash equilibria, we can state the following
proposition:
7
Given a move to compatibility in the second stage, the prot maximizing location in the case of
deviating is d
B
= 2a. Then, the supplier of variant B would make prots of 0:

8a
2
t. This, however, is
only of relevance when his competitor agrees to the move to compatibility. Hence, in order to deduce
all the parameter constellations for which oering identical variants is a Nash equilibrium, we would
have to examine whether the deviating supplier prefers compatibility or incompatibility and whether
his competitor agrees to an eventual move to compatibility. However, as already mentioned, these
calculations are unnecessary because in the case of coexisting Nash equilibria, it is obvious that the
duopolistic solutions are the relevant equilibria.
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Proposition 1:
1. If the costs of compatibility are low both compared to the signicance of the network
eects and compared to the heterogeneity of preferences (Q < 0:5n(1   c) and Q <
2:75a
2
t), the suppliers opt for dierentiated product designs and subsequently establish
compatibility, i.e.
d

i
= 1:5a with 

= 0 (8)
holds. This results in a symmetric duopolistic equilibrium (m

i
= 0:5) where prots
amount to


i
= 3a
2
t   Q : (9)
2. If the costs of compatibility are high compared to the signicance of the network
eects and the latter is low compared to the heterogeneity of preferences (Q > 0:5n(1 
c) and n(1   c) < 5:5a
2
t), the suppliers opt for dierentiated product designs and
subsequently maintain incompatibility, i.e.
d

i
= 1:5a with 

= 1 (10)
holds. This results in a symmetric duopolistic equilibrium (m

i
= 0:5) where prots
amount to


i
= 3a
2
t   0:5n(1  c) : (11)
3. Finally, if both the costs of compatibility and the signicance of the network eects
are high compared to the heterogeneity of preferences (Q > 2:75a
2
t and n(1   c) >
5:5a
2
t), the suppliers opt for identical product designs and subsequently maintain in-
compatibility; then,
d

i
= 0 with 

= 1 (12)
holds. This results in competition for the market (m
A
= 1 or m
A
= 0) with normal
prots:


i
= 0 : (13)
The reason behind the rst two parts of this proposition is obvious. If there were
no costs of compatibility, the suppliers would always prefer a compatible duopoly to
an incompatible duopoly because a move to compatibility softens price competition
considerably. However, with xed costs of compatibility, they have to weigh the extra
11
prots from a move to compatibility and its costs. The third part of Proposition 1 is our
main new result with regard to market equilibria: A competition for the market with
identical product designs can happen although it leads only to normal prots. It must
be stressed that this result holds for parameter constellations where oering dieren-
tiated designs and competing within the market would lead to supranormal prots.
8
The reason behind this result is that in duopolistic Nash equilibria, the suppliers dif-
ferentiate their designs so excessively that they lie outside the support of the consumer
distribution. Otherwise, i.e. if the prot maximizing locations were inside this support,
a protable deviation and monopolization would not be possible. Then, competition
for the market can only take place in cases where duopolistic equilibria lead to negative
prots (which is a trivial result). However, as is well known, in duopolistic Nash equi-
libria, the variants' locations only lie outside the support of the consumer distribution
if, given a xed support, the consumer mass is not too concentrated around the center.
In order to illustrate the degree of robustness of our result, we will demonstrate this
by means of the family of triangular densities f(x) = (1 + 0:25)  jxj with support
 0:5  x  0:5 and with 0 <   4.
9
Here, the condition for equilibrium locations
outside the support of the distribution reads 0:75=f(0) > 0:5. With f(0) = 1 + 0:25,
this means  < 2. For  = 2, we obtain d

i
= 0:5, f(0) = 1:5, and f(0:5) = 0:5. For a
lower , f(0) is lower, f(0:5) are higher, and the locations d

i
lie outside the support
of the distribution. For a higher , the reverse holds.
8
This is the case for 2:75a
2
t < Q < 3a
2
t with n(1  c) > 6a
2
t (a compatible duopoly would result
in supranormal prots), for 5:5a
2
t < n(1  c) < 6a
2
t with Q > 3a
2
t (an incompatible duopoly would
result in supranormal prots), and when both 2:75a
2
t < Q < 3a
2
t and 5:5a
2
t < n(1  c) < 6a
2
t hold
(any duopoly would result in supranormal prots).
9
For  = 0, we obtain a uniform distribution with a = 0:5 as the lower borderline case;  = 4
results in the upper borderline case with f(0:5) = 0 and f(0) = 2. In order to preclude problems
which are caused by the fact that these densities are not dierentiable at the median, we assume that
they are suciently smoothed around x = 0 (by use of a higher-order polynom) so that existence and
uniqueness of the symmetric equilibria are guaranteed.
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5. Welfare Analysis
In this section, we discuss welfare realized in Nash equilibria and rst-best welfare
optima as well as second-best welfare optima. Whereas rst-best optima are derived
under the assumption that the social planner decides both on (in)compatibility and on
product designs, second-best optima are derived under the assumption that he only
decides on (in)compatibility and leaves the decision on product designs to the market.
As antitrust authorities cannot and do not intervene in the decisions on horizontal
product design, the second-best optima are the appropriate benchmark for deducing
practicable policy recommendations.
5.1 Realized Welfare
The calculation of realized total welfareW and cumulated consumer surplus S = W 
is straightforward. For product designs d

i
= 1:5a and d

i
= 0, we obtain by inte-
gration cumulated alienation eects of  1:08

3a
2
t and  0:

3a
2
t, respectively. Moreover,
whereas in a natural monopoly and under compatibility, cumulated network eects
amount to n(1   c), they only amount to n(0:5   0:25c) in an incompatible duopoly.
Taking into account the xed costs of compatibility of 2Q and equilibrium prots ac-
cording to Proposition 1, we obtain
Proposition 2:
1. If the suppliers oer dierentiated (d
i
= 1:5a) and compatible variants (i.e. for
Q < 0:5n(1  c) and Q < 2:75a
2
t), realized total welfare and consumer surplus amount
to
W

= b + n(1  c)   1:08

3a
2
t   2Q and (14)
S

= b + n(1  c)   7:08

3a
2
t ; respectively. (15)
2. If the suppliers oer dierentiated (d
i
= 1:5a) and incompatible variants (i.e. for
Q > 0:5n(1   c) and n(1   c) < 5:5a
2
t), realized total welfare and consumer surplus
amount to
W

= b + n(0:5  0:25c)   1:08

3a
2
t and (16)
S

= b + n(1:5  1:25c)   7:08

3a
2
t ; respectively. (17)
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3. Finally, if the suppliers oer homogeneous (d
i
= 0) but incompatible variants (i.e. for
Q > 2:75a
2
t and n(1 c) > 5:5a
2
t), realized total welfare and consumer surplus amount
to
W

= S

= b + n(1  c)   0:

3a
2
t : (18)
Note that the following corollary holds:
Corollary 1: A move to compatibility always hurts consumers as a whole, whereas
maintaining incompatibility is always in their interest.
Given a relatively low signicance of the network eects (n(1 c) < 5:5a
2
t), the suppli-
ers have to decide whether to compete in an incompatible or in a compatible duopoly.
Here, with regard to consumer surplus, the network-size advantage of compatibility is
overcompensated by its price disadvantage. For a relatively high signicance of the
network eects (n(1   c) > 5:5a
2
t), the suppliers have to decide whether to compete
in a compatible duopoly or for the market. Then, from the perspective of consumers,
compatibility has the disadvantage of leading to higher prices as well as to higher
cumulated alienation eects. Hence, in particular competition for the market with
incompatible homogeneous variants is in the interests of consumers.
5.2 First-Best Welfare
If there were no costs of compatibility, a social planner who decides on (in)compatibility
as well as on product designs would obviously realize a compatible duopoly with loca-
tions d
i
= 0:5a. This leads to maximal cumulated network eects of n(1   c) and
to minimal cumulated alienation eects of  0:08

3a
2
t. However, with Q > 0, he has
to weigh the network-size disadvantage of an incompatible duopoly and the costs of a
move to compatibility. Moreover, the alternative of realizing a monopoly with a variant
lying at the center of the consumer distribution then becomes relevant. Compared to
an incompatible duopoly (with d
i
= 0:5a), such a monopoly has the advantage of
higher cumulated network eects and the disadvantage of higher cumulated alienation
eects; compared to a compatible duopoly, the same disadvantage holds, but now it
has the advantage of avoiding the costs of compatibility. By comparing these three
alternatives, it is straightforward to prove the following proposition:
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Proposition 3:
1. If the costs of compatibility are very low both compared to the signicance of the
network eects and compared to the heterogeneity of preferences (Q < 0:25n(1  1:5c)
and Q < 0:125a
2
t), the rst-best welfare optimum is a symmetric duopoly with dier-
entiated (d
i
= 0:5a) and compatible variants.
2. If the costs of compatibility are not very low compared to the signicance of the
network eects but the latter is very low compared to the heterogeneity of preferences
(Q > 0:25n(1  1:5c) and n(1  c) < 0:5a
2
t), the rst-best welfare optimum is a sym-
metric duopoly with dierentiated (d
i
= 0:5a) and incompatible variants.
3. Finally, if neither the costs of compatibility nor the signicance of the network
eects is very low compared to the heterogeneity of preferences (Q > 0:125a
2
t and
n(1   c) > 0:5a
2
t), the rst-best welfare optimum is a monopoly whose variant is lo-
cated at the center of the consumer distribution.
Comparing these results with market equilibria according to Proposition 1 makes clear
that against the background of the rst-best optima, the market almost always fails.
A noteworthy exception is a competition for the market; whenever it happens, it is
rst-best welfare optimal.
5.3 Second-Best Welfare
In reality, antitrust authorities can and do only intervene in the decisions on (in)com-
patibility but not in the decisions on horizontal product designs. Hence, for deducing
policy recommendations, the appropriate welfare-theoretical benchmark are the wel-
fare levels which can be attained when the decisions on horizontal product designs are
left to the market. In order to derive these second-best optima, we only have to com-
pare realized welfare in a compatible duopoly with realized welfare in an incompatible
duopoly for n(1  c) < 5:5a
2
t and with realized welfare in a competition for the market
for n(1  c) > 5:5a
2
t. From Proposition 2, we obtain:
Proposition 4:
1. If the costs of compatibility are very low compared to the signicance of the net-
work eects and the latter is low compared to the heterogeneity of preferences (Q <
0:25n(1 1:5c) and n(1  c) < 5:5a
2
t), the second-best welfare optimum is a symmetric
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duopoly with dierentiated (d
i
= 1:5a) and compatible variants.
2. If the costs of compatibility are not very low compared to the signicance of the
network eects but the latter is low compared to the heterogeneity of preferences (Q >
0:25n(1 1:5c) and n(1  c) < 5:5a
2
t), the second-best welfare optimum is a symmetric
duopoly with dierentiated (d
i
= 1:5a) and incompatible variants.
3. Finally, if the signicance of the network eects is high compared to the heterogene-
ity of preferences (n(1   c) > 5:5a
2
t), the second-best welfare optimum is competition
for the market with homogeneous but incompatible variants (located at the center of the
consumer distribution) irrespective of the costs of compatibility.
The reason behind the rst two parts of this proposition is simply the trade-o between
the network-size advantage of compatibility and its costs. Our main new result with
regard to welfare is the third part. It must be stressed that it holds for any value of Q
because it is due to the fact that cumulated alienation eects are lower when there is
competition for the market. Thus, the reason behind it is that the erce competition
for the market forces the suppliers to oer product designs which match the preferences
of consumers as well as possible, whereas a move to compatibility softens competition
over product designs drastically. As for the robustness of this result, note that in the
case of the triangular distributions discussed at the end of the previous section, it holds
for any , i.e. irrespective of how steep the density function is.
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6. Policy Implications
Comparing second-best welfare optima according to Proposition 4 with Nash equilibria
according to Proposition 1 makes clear that there are ve dierent parameter regimes
and that in two of them, antitrust authorities should intervene in the compatibility
decisions.
 If the signicance of the network eects is low compared to the heterogeneity of
preferences (n(1  c) < 5:5a
2
t)
{ and the costs of compatibility are high compared to the signicance of the network
eects (Q > 0:5n(1 c)), the suppliers' decisions result in a duopoly with dierentiated
and incompatible variants, and this is second-best welfare optimal.
{ and the costs of compatibility are very low compared to the signicance of the net-
work eects (Q < 0:25n(1   1:5c)), the suppliers' decisions result in a duopoly with
dierentiated and compatible variants, and this is second-best welfare optimal.
{ and the costs of compatibility are neither high nor very low compared to the sig-
nicance of the network eects (0:25n(1   1:5c) < Q < 0:5n(1   c)), the suppliers'
decisions again result in a duopoly with dierentiated and compatible variants, but
now an incompatible duopoly is second-best welfare optimal. Hence, in this case, an-
titrust authorities should prohibit compatibility arrangements. Here, market equilibria
and welfare optima fall apart, because suppliers weigh the costs of compatibility and
the higher prices under compatibility, whereas antitrust authorities should weigh the
costs of compatibility and its network-size advantage.
 If the signicance of the network eects is high compared to the heterogeneity of
preferences (n(1  c) > 5:5a
2
t)
{ and the costs of compatibility are high compared to the heterogeneity of preferences,
too (Q > 2:75a
2
t), the suppliers' decisions result in a competition for the market, and
this is second-best welfare optimal.
{ and the costs of compatibility are low compared to the heterogeneity of preferences
(Q < 2:75a
2
t), the suppliers' decisions result in a duopoly with dierentiated and
compatible variants, whereas the second-best welfare optimum is a competition for the
market. Hence, here again, antitrust authorities should prohibit compatibility arrange-
ments. In this case, the falling apart of market equilibria and welfare optima is due
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to the fact that suppliers weigh the costs of compatibility and the higher prices under
compatibility, whereas what counts for antitrust authorities is that in a competition
for the market, costs of compatibility are avoided and consumers get a variant which
matches preferences better than the variants in a duopoly equilibrium do.
Hence, to sum up, we can conclude from Propositions 1 and 4:
Corollary 2: Antitrust authorities should never intervene when the market opts for
incompatibility and should permit compatibility arrangements only when the costs of
compatibility are very low compared to the signicance of the network eects (Q <
0:25n(1  1:5c)).
In particular, given the symmetric setting of our model, enforcing compatibility where
suppliers would otherwise opt for a competition for the market is a policy failure.
Here, compatibility arrangements must be seen as cartels which aim at softening both
competition in prices and over product designs.
Of course, in an asymmetric setting, policy implications can (but must not) be
dierent; see, for example, Katz and Shapiro (1998, pp. 29). Moreover, policy impli-
cations can be dierent in a longer-run perspective, i.e. in a model with endogenous
R&D expenditures, innovation, and entry; see, for example, Farrell and Katz (1998).
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